Have the Last Two Years Brought a "Zeitenwende" in Germany's Foreign and Defense Policy?
- Chloe Logan (Guest Writer)
- Mar 11
- 7 min read
-Edited by Isadore Hart
Introduction
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 sent shockwaves through Europe, prompting Germany to conduct a profound reassessment of its foreign and defence policy. In an address to the Bundestag, Chancellor Olaf Scholz described the invasion as a zeitenwende, meaning ‘turning point’ or ‘watershed moment’ with drastic consequences for
European security (Scholz, 2022). As a result, the term “zeitenwende” was thrust into German political lexicon and became a discursive debate in academic circles. For many, this signalled a break from
Germany’s post-World War II strategic culture, characterised by anti-militarism, multilateralism, and reliance on dialogue over force. This essay will evaluate the extent to which the last two
years have marked the beginning of a transformative realignment (zeitenwende) in Germany’s foreign and defence policy or whether enduring structural and ideational factors continue to anchor it in its historical civilian power paradigm. This article posits that while Germany has undertaken significant and unprecedented policy shifts over the past two years, these actions represent only the initial stages of a broader transformation envisioned by the zeitenwende, as domestic and ideational factors deeply constrain Germany. First, the article will frame its argument by defining a “zeitenwende” and delineating core traditions in German strategic culture to establish that a zeitenwende must be a significant and durable departure from existing practices. Then, the article will analyse the key policy shifts that signal the beginning of
a zeitenwende in Germany’s foreign and defence policy, including substantial and cross-policy policy shifts that challenge pacifist traditions in Germany, all of which are driven by the new
challenges posed by an evolving international environment. Finally, the article will conclude that due to implementation gaps, the constraints posed by domestic politics, and the enduring
influence of its civilian strategic culture, Germany’s ability to experience a true zeitenwende
remains limited.
Understanding Zeitenwende and German Strategic Culture
Zeitenwende
First, it is crucial to contextualise and define what constitutes a zeitenwende, to conclude whether (and to what extent) it has occurred. Olaf Scholz first utilised the term “zeitenwende” in an address to the Bundestag on February 27, 2022, stating that “The twenty-fourth of February 2022 marks a watershed in the history of our continent” (“Der 24. February 2022
markiert eine Zeitenwende in der Geschichte unseres Kontinents”)
and that “We are living through a watershed era” (“Wir erleben eine Zeitenwende”)(Ibid.). In his speech, Scholz identifies five courses of action for Germany to take at—what he considers—a critical turning point in history:
(1) Germany must provide robust military and political support for Ukraine.
(2) Germany will utilise targeted sanctions to deter Putin’s aggression.
(3) Germany must reinforce NATO's collective defence and bolster its eastern allies to prevent the conflict from spilling into other European countries.
(4) Germany commits to strengthening its security through unprecedented investments in the Bundeswehr, advancing defence capabilities, and increasing annual defence spending to over 2% of GDP while enhancing resilience through renewable energy development and EU sovereignty.
(5) Germany must recognise the invasion as a turning point in its foreign and defence policy to address the evolving security landscape (Ibid.).
Scholz’s initial speech thrust the term zeitenwende into the forefront of political discussion, and he further builds upon this in his December 2022 Foreign Affairs article. He broadens the
concept of zeitenwende from a response to the shock of the invasion of Ukraine to one with more global implications. For example, Scholz advances Germany’s responsibility to maintain security to a responsibility for all of Europe (Scholz, 2022). By elevating the zeitenwende to the global level, the term “has become a shorthand for foreign policy change even though its original meaning was to describe the implications of Russia’s war against Ukraine for international politics” (Mello, 2024, p.2). Therefore, zeitenwende can be understood as a turning point in Germany’s foreign and defence policy in the context of new global challenges. However, while Germany appears to have made significant policy changes, the extent to which these actions represent an actual watershed moment
remains contested. Given this understanding of zeitenwende, it is necessary to establish the benchmarks by which to measure the extent of a zeitenwende. A zeitenwende change needs to be both “significant and durable,” or in other words, a substantial change that is sustained over time (Mader & Schoen, 2023, p.527). A substantial policy change typically includes (1) modifications in an actor’s international role,
(2) program and/or goal reorientation, and (3) foreign policy redirection across multiple issue areas (Hermann, 1990, p.5-6). Thus, a significant zeitenwende in Germany will reflect these key changes, and its policies must demonstrate longevity. Ultimately, a zeitenwende will be a “brutal refutation of widely shared core foreign policy beliefs, on which German foreign policy has been based” (Bunde, 2022, p.518).
German Foreign/Defence Policy and Strategic Culture
Next, it is crucial to understand the foundational elements of German foreign and defence policy and its strategic culture to assess whether significant policy shifts have occurred. German foreign policy has been profoundly shaped by a strategic culture rooted in the historical legacy of World War II. Guided by the principles of "never again war" and “never again Auschwitz,” Germany's foreign policy has consistently emphasised pacifism, a commitment to multilateralism, and a strong aversion to militarism. These characteristics are distilled into a German identity that crucially perceives itself as both a civilian power and as European (Gaskarth & Oppermann, 2021, p.88). As a civilian power, Germany has been constitutionally and culturally averse to using force, favouring supranationalism at the regional level, such as through the European Union (O’Neal, 2024, p.4). This aversion to militarism and commitment to peace and European integration is enshrined constitutionally in Germany’s 1949 Basic Law. The law states, “Conscious of their responsibility before God and man and inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe, the German people, in exercise of their constituent power, have adopted this Basic Law” (FR of Germany, 1949). Germany’s core national purpose, seeking peace, and its method of achieving it through equal partnership in a united Europe place its actions in the international arena within aframework of multilateralism and dialogue.
Given this commitment to pacifism and multilateralism, Germany’s "political-military culture is infused with anti-militarism." (O’Neal, p.4). Germany maintains relatively low levels of military expenditure, and the country relies on a broader security vision that de-emphasises traditional hard power, focusing instead on non-militaristic means of influence and integrated security models. This strategic orientation has sharply contrasted with the more militarised approaches of other global powers, defining Germany’s foreign policy identity as primarily diplomatic, cooperative, and committed to peaceful, multilateral frameworks.
Despite changes in Germany’s material capabilities and geopolitical position, this
ideational foundation, rooted in the aftermath of WWII and the Holocaust, continues to influence and constrain Germany's foreign policy. The country's identity as a civilian power is reflected in policy rhetoric, where leaders emphasise "We Europeans" and "We in Europe" rather than "Germany” or “Germans," underscoring the nation’s dedication to integration and collective European interests (Gaskarth & Oppermann, p.89). This ethos is seen in Germany’s central role within the EU, where German interests are presented as synonymous with those of the collective European community.
A Zeitenwende in Practice?
Given the understanding of a zeitenwende and the historical context of German foreign policy, it is crucial first to examine the evidence indicating a potential zeitenwende and then the persistent challenges to its implementation—ultimately demonstrating that while a shift has
begun, it has yet to realise in the past two years.
Evidence of a Zeitenwende
The changing international scene has prompted a significant re-evaluation of the efficacy of German foreign and defence policies. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine is part of “a series of
problems [that] have rocked the foundation of European security in recent years,” such as the
Arab Spring, Eurozone and other global financial crises, Brexit and the first Trump presidency (Ibid, p.85). Along with a rapidly evolving international scene, such issues challenge existing German foreign policy traditions that value dialogue, regional institutions, and pacifism. Further, “changes in the international environment will make it more difficult for Germany to withstand outside pressure from its allies” (Bunde, p.525). Since 2022, Germany has enacted several key policy reorientations (foreign policy/defence modernisation, energy policy,
and economic and trade adjustments) that clearly “set zeitenwende apart from the post-Cold War era” (Mello, p.3). Several policy reorientations in Germany have begun challenging its pacifist traditions, as reflected in political discourse—signalling a shift toward a more militarised approach to policymaking. For instance, in 2022, German Defence Minister Christine Lanbrecht stated, “It has become clear by now that at its heart, this debate is about how Germany understands its role as a nation, as a neighbor, as a democracy, as an ally […] Germany’s size, its geographic location its economic power, in short: its heft makes it a leading power whether we want to or not. And that includes the military domain” (Federal Minister of Defence & Scholz, 2022). This discourse, coupled with Olaf Scholz’s speech and Germany’s first National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2023, signals a shifting willingness to use greater military means and hold responsibility at the global level.
Further, though Germany has traditionally maintained low investment in the Bundeswehr,
Scholz pledged a surplus defence budget of 100 billion euros, increases in the regular defence budget, and extensive arms deliveries (heavy weaponry) to support Ukraine (Mello, p.7). This military sondervermögen (off-budget fund) was not only unprecedented in its content but also prompted constitutional change, circumventing a ‘debt brake’ in place to prohibit creating off-budget deficits (Ibid.).
Further, Germany reaffirmed its commitment to NATO diplomatically despite previously being regarded as one of the least reliable members in terms of GDP contribution to collective defence. Additionally, Germany bolstered its military commitment to NATO’s eastern flank, announcing a permanent deployment of 4,000 soldiers to Lithuania (Ibid.).
However, according to Hermann’s framework, there must be “foreign policy redirection in many issue areas” in order to experience a foreign policy reorientation—Germany, since 2022, has enacted changes “across policy domains,” including economic, foreign, refugee, and energy policy (Ibid, p.6-8). For instance, Germany has completely banned gas from Russian oil (and iron, steel, and coal) despite its historic energy dependence on Russian gas (Ibid, p.11).
Germany has also removed Russian banks from international financial systems
and implemented a “paradigm change” in its refugee policy in response to the Ukrainian humanitarian crisis (Ibid.). These actions reflect a broader shift in Germany's foreign and domestic policy frameworks, signalling a willingness to adopt more assertive and adaptive measures in response to international crises, even as they challenge traditional policy norms. These sweeping policy shifts across defence, energy, economic, and
refugee domains represent clear evidence of a zeitenwende—marking a fundamental break from Germany's post-Cold War era and redefining its role as a more assertive and globally engaged power.
Limitations and Persistent Challenges to Zeitenwende (Durability)
Despite significant policy shifts, the reality of a German zeitenwende remains persistently and deeply inhibited by implementation gaps, domestic constraints, and entrenched civilian power identity/strategic culture. In the two years since Scholz’s initial speech, it appears that “Germany’s defence policy is already falling short of expectations” (Ulatowski, 2024, p.60). Germany is experiencing several implementation gaps where the nation is failing to fulfil its zeitenwende policy commitments. Germany’s defence spending remains significantly below NATO targets (hovering at around 1.5%), and the 2% commitment is becoming more of a baseline than a ceiling for contributions (Mello, p.7). Moreover, Germany’s reluctance to export battle tanks to Ukraine showcases the political hesitation to fully embrace militarised responses despite zeitenwende rhetoric (O’Neal, p.2).
Significant implementation gaps in policy execution point to the complexity of translating strategic vision into concrete action.
Domestically, Germany’s coalition government has been largely hesitant and risk-averse in implementing some of the more significant policy overhauls. Handl elucidates this, writing, “the coalition has been internally differentiated and has struggled to act coherently…at the same time Scholz ́s attitude has been restrained by the view of possible risks of escalation and a spill- over of the conflict into a much broader war. The Chancellor thus gradually arrived at a restrained multilateralist line of policy response
to the Russian actions in Ukraine” (Handl, Nigrin, & Mejstrík, 2023, p.514). Much of this aligns with pre-existing German strategic culture and political attitudes (multilateralism, regionalism, dialogue, culture of restraint, etc.). This is also evident at the public opinion level. Though there were apparent shifts in policy attitudes directly related to the immediate invasion, the general public’s stance on Russia-Ukraine remained essentially unchanged, and any immediate changes in responses appear to be influenced by ‘shock value’ (do not represent the durability of change) (Mader & Schoen, p.526).
Finally, Germany’s self-perception as a civilian power identity remains ‘sticky’ as there is a “tendency for strategic culture to persist even when objective conditions change
dramatically” (O’Neal, p.2). Germany is built on “antimilitarist cognitive models” that “have been widely shared in Germany and are difficult to change, as they are very basic elements in German identity constructions” (Bunde, p.523). Simply, as strategic culture is based on norms and identity, it is difficult to alter it in a short time frame—the reality is that it has only been two years since the initial zeitenwende speech. These ‘sticky’ ideational commitments are evident in the language used in official German documents that, despite the significant policy departures, still consistently frame the zeitenwende within a European and multilateral perspective. Scholz commits Germany to Europe further, stating that “Europe is our framework for action” (Scholz, 2022). Scholz’s restrained stance, balancing his calls for change and the necessity to avoid broader military escalation, further limits Germany’s ability to fully realise the zeitenwende. This is further compacted by focusing on integrated and collective security measures (e.g., European Union, NATO), which are particularly highlighted in the 2023 NSS (Government of Germany). To conclude, Germany has taken significant steps in creating a more robust and assertive foreign and defence policy. However, Germany’s difficulties in implementing policy change, domestic constraints, and ideational commitments limit the effectiveness and durability of the changes, with a continued preference for moderate militarism and a more reserved approach to Europe’s security challenges.
Conclusion
Thus, this article has evaluated the extent to which there has been a zeitenwende in
German foreign and defence policy since 2022. The consistent argument was that, though Germany has taken unprecedented steps in its foreign and defence policy, it is deeply constrained by significant implementation gaps, domestic factors, and its civilian power identity. Therefore, a zeitenwende has only just begun. In conclusion, Germany’s zeitenwende remains constrained by persistent challenges, including implementation gaps, domestic political limitations, and the enduring influence of its civilian strategic culture.
It is important to note that the debate surrounding the zeitenwende is a relatively recent topic in European studies and political science—the literature is developing alongside the zeitenwende itself and its associated discourse. Consequently, the literature remains fresh but limited in scope, spanning only the past few years, with much potential for future research. For instance, further research (with enough time) will be able to better determine the extent of a
durable zeitenwende.
It remains clear that though Germany has taken its first steps to address the pressing needs of today's international challenges, Germany needs sustained political will and maintained momentum to live up to its zeitenwende promises.
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