The Korean War and China’s involvement stands as a significant flashpoint in Cold War history. The strategic considerations driving Chinese intervention in the Korean peninsula are multifaceted. The choice to intervene in this war reflects a combination of considerations. These include national security concerns rooted in their fear of foreign imperialist threats, historical fears, ideological solidarity with North Korea, and a desire to assert China's influence on the international stage as a Communist World leader. Moreover, as the United States and its allies sought to contain the spread of communism in Asia, China perceived the conflict as a direct threat to its own security and regional dominance. Moreover, China's intervention in North Korea was marked by a strategic calculus aimed at using North Korea as a strategic “buffer zone” in order to protect its industrial region of Manchuria which China perceived as open to encroachments by Western powers near its borders. Understanding these strategic considerations requires an exploration of both the Beijing’s decision-making process, providing insight into the sophisticated subtleties in international relations that defined this pivotal moment in East Asian history.
Fear of Foreign Imperialist Threats
One of the main strategic considerations underscoring China’s decision to intervene in the Korean war was rooted in its recent historical events. One has to understand that just before the event of the Korean war, as Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai describes it, China was a Confucian Kingdom in which it had practiced a policy of isolationism where trade and contact with the outside world was almost entirely restricted. Hence, its isolationism from the outside world was taken advantage of by European colonists. Invaded by foreign powers, the Chinese state was wholly unprepared for contact with the outside world and suffered a military defeat. For the Chinese, this was a great humiliation to their national pride. [1] Moreover, for the CCP leaders, prior to their ascension to the leadership of the state, the political legitimacy they held was derived from returning China to its former glory and they were expected to defend against foreign invaders in the same way they had repelled their Japanese invaders. [2] As a result, the Chinese were extremely suspicious of any threat that was posed by a foreign power. As noted by Jian Chen, when America had landed its soldiers in the Korean Peninsula, it forced the Chinese Communist party to recalculate their original perceptions of the East Asian international situation. For Mao, his victory over the Nationalist Party during the Chinese Civil War and his taking of the Chinese state presented to him a “the weak point of the international front of imperialism”. [3] Hence, American intervention in the Korean Peninsula highlighted two problems for China’s strategic considerations. Firstly, America’s intervention involved sending the seventh fleet into the Korean peninsula which severely hampered China’s attempts at freeing Taiwan from the yoke of Nationalist rule as this meant that they were unable to plan their amphibious invasion of the country and fulfilling their mission of reuniting China. [4] Secondly, it signalled to the Chinese state that the East Asian peninsula was not “the weak point of the international front of imperialism” as it once thought it was. [5] Hence, this gave the Chinese State all the more reason to intervene as a means to protect itself from the threat of Western Imperialism. Another strategic consideration that underscored Chinese intervention in the region was as Zhang Xiaoming points out, Korea’s historical role for Chinese Humiliation. While Korea did not act as an exploitative imperialist power, it in fact served as Japan’s “invasion corridor” in which Japan inflicted horrible atrocities upon the Chinese State. Hence when the Americans landed in Korea, Chinese security considerations at once again possibly being at the mercy of a foreign threat was once again re-affirmed. [6] This concern was further backed up by the fact that according to Patrick Roe, in the early summer of 1950, that General MacArthur had personally overseen an “inspection trip” in which Chiang Kai Shek had promised to contribute thirty thousand troops to the United Nations Command’s efforts in the Korean War. [7] Hence, one could understand how the Chinese would have concerns about the encroachment of KMT and American forces as they could possibly use this as a reason to make the Korean War a peninsula war. As seen, China’s relationship with its past at the hands of colonial rule played a major role in developing their strategic concerns when it decided to intervene in the Korean war.
Entering the International
Another Strategic concern that underscored China’s intervention in the Korean War can be traced back to China’s historical isolation. Under the Qing Dynasty, China as mentioned before, was an isolationist state so much so that it did not even have a ministry of affairs until March 1861. [8] While diplomatic relations did gradually improve under the Republican period, one could argue that the newly formed Communist Chinese State was as it perceived, was in a similar diplomatic situation to the Qing dynasty; that is, the fact it was cut off from most diplomatic relations with the added caveat that it did not run a tributary system in which they could extract payments from like the Qing did with its vassals. Here, entering the Korean War would help address some of its strategic concerns. For example, as Patrick Roe states, one of the strategic concerns that underscored Chinese intervention in the Korean Peninsula was so that it could enhance the security of the Manchurian region. This is especially important as the Manchurian region was the industrial heartland of the Chinese state. Hence, if North Korea fell, Manchuria would become vulnerable to attack from what they deemed as imperialist powers. [9] We can see this sentiment echoed in Zhou Enlai’s report stating “China and Korea are neighboring countries as closely related as lips and teeth. If the lips are gone, the teeth are exposed to the cold. If the D.P.R.K is subjugated by U.S. imperialism, there will be no security for northeast China. Half of our heavy industry is in the Northeast, and half of the heavy industry in the Northeast is in its southern parts, within range of enemy bombers.” [10] Another reason that underscored Chinese intervention laid in both Mao’s revolution in China and Kim Ill’’s Sung’s revolution in North Korea as while it brought the two states closer together, Kim was extremely weary of the “Chinese Faction” within his political party. As a result, for the Chinese Communist party, by intervening in this war, not only would the Chinese communist party have closer ties with the North Korean Communist Party, but it would also effectively have a heavy hand in the direction of Korea’s political development in the event of re-unification. [11] In order to understand this policy decision, it can be traced back to the relationship the Qing dynasty had with its tributary state of Korea. This being the relationship of subordination to China. This concept is further expanded upon by King Chen who argues that China’s involvement in the Korean War was to secure its past status as a regional power. Essentially, as Chen writes “In other words, Peking wants to establish a Monroe Doctrine in Asia”. [12] And to ensure that its strategic concerns about regional security were fulfilled. This is further explored with China essentially using Korea as a buffer state against foreign incursion. As Il-Keun Park explains, the Chinese decision to send troops was summarized in the phrase “Saving one's neighborhood is saving oneself." [13]
China Forced to Act
While the interpretations of China’s actions above paint China as an active player in its strategic concerns as a reason to intervene in North Korea, this interpretation paint a much more nuanced picture with regards to North Korean Intervention combining different analyses. While again, this interpretation does take into consideration the strategic considerations of the Chinese state in its decision to intervene in the Korean Peninsula, Yufan and Zhihai point out that it was also due to China being caught between the aggression of the Soviet Union and The United States. [14] To further explore this, one must first understand the American domestic situation of the Chinese Civil War. Towards the end of the Chinese Civil War, Truman’s faith in the KMT’s army to win the civil war had started to wane. However, due to domestic pressures, he was forced to continue to support the KMT and in April 1949, approved further aid of 54 million USD and 75 million USD to Chiang Kai Shek’s troops. [15] Moreover, with Truman not approaching Mao in any way to discuss a peace deal or opening of diplomatic relations, the Chinese misinterpreted Truman’s disengagement policy as continued and active assistance to the KMT. Hence, China feeling diplomatically cornered, pursued an alignment policy with the USSR stating that “it would now lean to the side of the Soviet Union”. [16] Hence, when the Korean war broke out, Chen Jian argued that the “Mao Zedong and others in Beijing should not have been surprised by the North Korean invasion, but they were certainly shocked by the quick and unyielding American reaction.” [17] Hence, in order to maintain its newfound and only alliance with the Soviet Union and North Korea, it reluctantly joined the war. This interpretation is interesting as it paints China’s main strategic considerations in a defensive light as it only joined the war to maintain relations with its newfound neighbours. As Bangning Zhou points out, the initial decision to intervene was cut short by the Soviet Union’s withdrawl of air support. As seen, Chinese intervention in North Korea was not by any means Mao’s active want to confront the United States but rather, due to security concerns. [18] While previous interpretations in this essay interpret China’s intervention in the Korean war with its relationship to the historical ties of the region as an aggressive attempt to reclaim what was lost during the century of humiliation and western aggression; or tied directly to the immediate security concerns, Bangning Zhou instead points to the internal pressure faced by such an invasion combined with the diplomatic situation caused by China’s misinterpretation of Truman’s disengagement policy during the civil war as America’s attempt to pursue a re-invasion of China. As seen, because China misinterpreted Truman’s policy and delivered his famous speech titled "On the people's democratic dictatorship” where he denounced America as an imperialist power. [19] It had forced itself into a position where it had to back its allies. This can be seen when Mao at a specially convened enlarged Politubro meeting and decided to intervene in the Korean war saying that if they did not intervene, “Internationalism would be empty talk.” With regards to backing its allies. [20] In this case, we can see that within the Chinese strategy, because it was unable to engage diplomatically with the USA and since he had committed to being aligned with the Soviets, backing the North Koreans and the Soviets would ensure that they would be protected in case of any future invasion. Moreover, as mentioned before, the North Korean border borders Manchuria and hence, it would be more costly to China’s reconstruction efforts if the industrial region of China comes under threat. As seen, in this interpretation of the strategic concerns which underscore China’s decision to intervene in North Korea, one can see that it was a combination of maintaining alliances, domestic concerns and ensuring that historical concerns from the threat of foreigners which defined this interpretation.
Ultimately, when comparing these interpretations, it is this essay’s view that ultimately it was a combination of security and domestic concerns which were the main strategic considerations underscoring China’s intervention in North Korea. Here, the argument made by King Chen as mentioned earlier in the essay, in which he argues that Communist China viewed North Korea not as an ally but a potential tributary state to be exploited is weak. [21] Firstly, this view assumes that Communist China had the same views as Confucian China and viewed outsiders barbarians. Mao’s Marxist internationalism as explained by Yufan and Zhihai [22] would not have perceived North Korea as a tributary state and thus, the strategic considerations which underscored Mao’s decision to intervene would not have been imperialistic in nature. Rather, the main strategic concerns which underscored China’s decision to intervene in the Korean war was due to the conditions in which America and China’s relationship had soured significantly following the civil war and China’s alignment with the Soviet union. Moreover, the possibility of the United States pushing towards China’s northeastern border, may have triggered Taiwanese forces to pursue an invasion into Mainland China through Manchuria both risking an invasion and destroying China’s industrial base.
[1] Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited”, The China Quarterly, Vol 1 No. 121 (1990): 95
[2] Yufan and Zhihai ,“China’s Decision”, 95
[3] Jian Chen, “China's Changing Aims during the Korean War, 1950—1951”, The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1992) 9
[4] Chen, “Changing Aims”, 9
[5] Chen, “Changing Aims”, 10
[6] Zhang Xiaoming, “The Korean Peninsula and China’s National Security: Past, Present and Future”, Asian Persepctive, Vol 22 No.3 (1998): 262
[7] Patrick C. Roe, The Dragon Strikes: China and the Korean War, June-December 1950, (Manhattan, New York: Random House Publishing Group, 1950), 79-80.
[8] Zhou Fangyin, “The Role of Ideational and Material Factors in the Qing Dynasty Diplomatic Transformation”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics Vol 1 No.3 (2007): 469
[9] Roe, The Dragon Strikes, 68.
[10] Zhou Enlai, The Selected Works of Zhou Enlai (Beijing, China: Foreign Languages Press, 1989), 60
[11] Jian Chen, “China's Changing Aims during the Korean War, 1950—1951”, The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1992) 10
[12] King Chen, “The Foreign Policy of The People’s Republic of China”, Naval War College Review, Vol 19 No.7 (1967): 91
[13] Il-Keun Park, “Chinese Foreign Policy and the Korean Peninsula”, International Journal of Korean Studies, Vol 3 No. 1 (1999): 117
[14] Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited”, The China Quarterly, Vol 1 No. 121 (1990): 114
[15] Yufan and Zhihai ,“China’s Decision”, 96
[16] Yufan and Zhihai ,“China’s Decision”, 97
[17] Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War (New York, United States of America: Columbia University Press, 1994), 126,
[18] Bangning Zhou, “Explaining China's Intervention in the Korean War in 1950”, Interstate - Journal of International Affairs, Vol 1. No. 1 (2015): 1
[19] Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited”, The China Quarterly, Vol 1 No. 121 (1990): 97
[20] Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China’s Decision”, 105-106
[21] King Chen, “The Foreign Policy of The People’s Republic of China”, Naval War College Review, Vol 19 No.7 (1967): 91
[22] Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China’s Decision”, 105-106
References
Chen, Jian. “China's Changing Aims during the Korean War, 1950-1951”, The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, 1, No. 1 (Spring 1992) 9,10
Chen, King. “The Foreign Policy of The People’s Republic of China”, Naval War College Review, 19 No.7 (March 1967): 91
Enlai, Zhou The Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Beijing, China: Foreign Languages Press, 1989
Fangyin, Zhou, “The Role of Ideational and Material Factors in the Qing Dynasty Diplomatic Transformation”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics 1 No.3 (Summer 2007): 469
Jian, Chen China’s Road to the Korean War, New York, United States of America: Columbia University Press, 1994
Park, Il-Keun “Chinese Foreign Policy and the Korean Peninsula”, International Journal of Korean Studies, 3 No. 1 (Spring/Summer 1999): 117
Roe, Patrick C., The Dragon Strikes: China and the Korean War, June-December 1950, Manhattan, New York: Random House Publishing Group, 1950
Xiaoming, Zhang. “The Korean Peninsula and China’s National Security: Past, Present and Future”, Asian Persepctive, 22 No.3 (1998): 262
Yufan, Hao and Zhihai, Zai. “China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited”, The China Quarterly, 1 No. 121 (March, 1990): 95,96,97,105,106,114
Zhou, Bangning “Explaining China's Intervention in the Korean War in 1950”, Interstate - Journal of International Affairs, 1. No. 1 (Spring/Summer2015)