Has nationalism been primarily a cause for order or disorder in international politics since 1945?
Before one can answer whether nationalism has been a cause for order or disorder in international politics since 1945, one must first define the terms nationalism, order, and disorder. Nationalism as a concept is extremely difficult to define and perhaps, it is important to accept that there is no set definition of nationalism. Instead, nationalism as a concept should be understood in the context of the relationship between who is defined as the “ideal” inhabitants of the state and how state power is managed in relation to its described “ideal” inhabitants.[1] As for the definition of order in international politics, this essay will use Hedley Bull’s thesis and take the position that we live in an “anarchic society” and thus, the “order” that exists in the international community, is made up of what Hedley Bull describes as “a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society.”[2] While the society of states or international society comes about when contact is made between two states, it remains a “thin” international system as described by Bull without institutions to necessitate a structured form of order.[3] Nonetheless, there is still an understanding in which states represent territorial sovereignty and share a degree of shared norms and values. However, in order to create a sustained order, it requires what Nabi refers to as Grigoriev’s “necessarian model” of order in which the international order is supported by institutions such as the UN in which states use institutions to regulate behaviour as a result of a conscious effort by states to maintain contact.[4] Hence, when defining “disorder” in international politics this essay would argue that “disorder” is a disruption to the activity in which the “international society” has strived hard to maintain. This could be done through reckless actions such as illegal wars or violations of treaties set out by these institutions or to a certain extent, pursuing policy goals that go against the “spirit” of an inclusive international community while not necessarily contravening said institutions. Thus, one can define it as actions that go against the norms set out by the “necessarian order” in which institutions attempt to regulate state actions. With these words defined, this essay argues that nationalism as defined by each individual state and its interactions with the international community, can both be the primary cause of order and disorder in international politics since 1945.
However, before we start to delve into individual examples of nationalism being the cause of order or disorder in international politics, we must first provide clarity on the state of international politics following the events of the Second World War which ended in 1945. Following the Second World War, a new world order had to be set up to manage the effects of the war. Historians of the nationalist discipline have argued that both Roosevelt and Truman in an attempt to tried to create a peaceful world, in which The United States (US), The United Kingdom (UK), and The Soviet Union (USSR) existed, would use the institutions created such as the Bretton Woods System and the United Nations to “police, disarm and develop the world”. However, this ultimately failed due to the USSR’s unwillingness to partake in this “liberal international order”. [5] However, this view doesn’t take into account that following the Second World War, there were numerous states such as China, India, and much of Eastern Europe which had recently undergone de-colonization and were starting to struggle with ideas of national identity and nationalism. This issue of decolonization, one could argue would both act as a cause for order and disorder in international politics. Moreover, following the collapse of the Cold War in 1991, liberal international theorists such as Fukuyama argued that liberalism had triumphed and that “ultranationalism, with its promise of unending conflict leading to disastrous military defeat had completely lost its appeal.”[6] And that even the threat of a “systemic nationalism” was null and void as the “world's nationalist movements do not have a political program beyond the negative desire of independence from some other group or people, and do not offer anything like a comprehensive agenda for socio-economic organization.”[7] However, in recent years as Kochi argues, there seems to be a return of “right-wing nationalism” in the face of the growing economic inequality in which the Fukuyama’s liberal international order seems unable to deal with.[8] Hence, we can identify two nexus points this being the creation of a new liberal international order which had to contend with both the USSR and the aftermath of decolonization following the Second World War and the end of the Cold War in which the liberal international order is currently dealing with the nationalism arising from the impact of neoliberalism. Hence, this essay will explore how nationalism both can primarily act as both a cause for order and disorder in international politics when taking into account the historical context of both decolonization and the end of the cold war.
The first example of nationalism which will be explored with regards to it being the cause of order and disorder in international politics, will be the complex and multi-faceted nationalism of the Chinese State. Here, Suisheng Zhao points to three types of nationalism that define Communist China. These are the nativist strain, the Anti-traditionalist strain, and finally, the pragmatist strain of nationalism. [9] The nativist strain, as described by Zhao points to Nativism as a particular strain of nationalism that emphasizes Confucian self-reliance and isolationism from the international community asking for the Chinese state to look inward for development. Moreover, it identifies foreign imperialism as the cause for China’s backwardness.[10] This form of nationalism although first born out of the anti-imperialist struggle of the boxer rebellion in the 1900s, continued to play an active role in the crafted narrative of the Chinese state. By using Ornella’s and Michelsen’s definition of nationalism,[11] one can see how the Chinese state justifies to its population (in this case, the Chinese people) by using its anti-imperialist past to justify state actions toward foreigners in a confrontational and to a certain extent, antagonistic manner which brought about a disorder in international politics. This inflammatory and isolationist form of nationalism was catalysed during the Cultural Revolution in which as Robert Scalapino describes, how “Red Guards displaced professional diplomats or cowed them” which led to “attacks upon a Soviet ship in Dairen” and “the burning of the British legation”. [12] As seen, this form of nationalism can be seen to be a primary cause for disorder within international politics as it seeks to undo the “thin” international society in which states seek to as described by Bull. [13] While this form of confrontation has died down since the Cold War, this strain of nationalism still plays an important, albeit more subtle role within Chinese nationalism. This can be seen in 2012 when Xi Jinping unveiled his policy of the “Chinese Dream”. Through his speech, he talked about China’s national struggle and as Bhattacharya describes “harping on first, the ‘victim’ narrative underscored in the century of humiliation, and then, the revival era of China under the stewardship of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party).” [14] The second strain of nationalism named “The anti-traditionalist strain” on the other hand, emphasizes cooperation and implementation of western institutions. This form of nationalism reached its peak popularity within the Communist Party’s political consciousness in the 1980s to early 2000s period in which Zhao describes this period of Communist China’s history as having faced “a crisis of faith in socialism, a crisis of confidence in the future of the country, and a crisis of trust in the party.” [15] This form of nationalism saw China abandon the class struggle that dominated the Mao period and anti-imperialism which saw itself isolated from the liberal international order. Instead, this form of nationalism re-envisioned China as a global power on the world stage engaged in global peacekeeping efforts in the Congo and Haiti and even acted as a key partner in managing the 1997 global financial crisis. [16] While once again this strain of nationalism saw a decline in recent years with Xi Jinping capitalizing on the Anti-American sentiment in many countries going as far as to argue for an end to the Westphalian system of states, [17] it still plays a part in shaping China’s unique brand of nationalism. As seen, this brand of nationalism can be seen as a primary driver of order in international politics as it sees China partake in the “necessarian model” of international politics partaking in international peacekeeping efforts and contributing to international trade. Lastly, Zhao’s last defined nationalism named “Pragmatist nationalism” argues that this form of nationalism is “interest driven”. [18] Hence, one can argue that this form of nationalism is a syncretic form of Chinese nationalism that combines both the aforementioned Nativist and Anti-Traditionalist strains of nationalism. For the pragmatic nationalist, both forms of nationalist ideologies, although contradictory, can be true. Hence, one can argue that this pragmatic nationalism should be understood as a spectrum between Nativist and Anti-Traditionalist viewpoints. For example, as Bhattacharya points out that while Xi did employ nativist rhetoric while unveiling his new policy of the “Chinese dream”, pointing out the centuries of humiliation suffered at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialists, he also drew upon Qing dynasty ideas of “self-strengthening” in which the Qing dynasty at the time used as a term to justify using western technology to improve the crumbling dynasty. [19] Within Xi’s context, however, one could argue that this was Xi attempting to draw parallels between an anti-traditionalist strain of nationalism that promoted foreign cooperation with the liberal democratic order and that of globalization. In this instance, one can argue that this dominant strain of nationalism that has come to dominate Chinese foreign policy, with its pragmatic nature can both act as a way for Chinese nationalism to act as both the primary cause for order and disorder within international politics.
The second case of nationalism that will be explored will be the nationalism of the United States. In this analysis of American nationalism, the concept of American exceptionalism. American exceptionalism is a particularly interesting idea as it promotes both a vision in which this form of nationalism can bring about order in international politics and when applied differently, can be the cause for disorder within international politics. When discussing how American exceptionalism has become the primary cause for order since 1945, one must first understand its historical roots. American exceptionalism is rooted in the story of its founding of its state. The myth of American exceptionalism is rooted in the idea that the foreign settlers who came to what is now known as America, wanted to create a nation based on Enlightenment principles and hence when the nation was founded, it was as Restad describes “universalistic” and hence, this form of nationalism was “civic” and not ethnic. Moreover, since this form of nationalism was founded on the idea of being “born modern” it did not have to “undergo a wrenching transition to modernity.” [20] In a sense, one could argue that the American nationalist myth was that it was always modern as they were the first nation to be “exceptional in its blessings of liberty and republicanism.” [21] Hence, in order to be an American, it wasn’t based on the idea of geography, but rather, based on accepting freedom as a fundamental concept. Hence, when American foreign policy is forged, it is based on this concept of “American exceptionalism”, and is developed with the idea that American expansionism, intervention, and creation of international institutions as both fundamental to its identity and for a stable word. This nationalism can be seen as a primary cause for order as in an attempt to re-create the world in their image and to spread their values, American foreign policy is based around global cooperation through institutions as these institutions would reinforce american values. This can be seen following the end of the Cold War when Saddam had invaded Kuwait. The United Nations, a project of the American state, its allies, and adversaries came together and expelled Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Most notably, after this incident, the war did not escalate and Iraqi sovereignty was respected. [22] As seen, the United States along with its allies had set up an international institution that was able to execute its nationalist goals of freedom and democracy and hence, can be seen as the primary cause of order within international politics.
However, in recent years as Thapiporn Suporn notes, that the United States under Donald Trump has taken on a tone of “Jacksonian populism” in regard to its foreign policy. This foreign policy draws upon the idea that the American government should ensure the “physical security and economic well-being of the American people in their national home.[23] For Donald Trump and his base, they feel that America’s involvement in foreign affairs and involvement with the globalization of the world has led America astray. [24] As a result, his brand of nationalism focuses on the crisis of globalization and what it does to the American identity spurring economically nationalist sentiments abroad in order to protect the “white identity”[25] of America. Due to this perception, Trump has turned its back on the internationalism of previous administrations and has cancelled several free trade agreements such as the TPP without presenting an alternative. [26] As seen, these actions cause disorder within international politics as these actions contravene the idea of an “international society” as America isolates itself from the world. A clear example of the difference in foreign policy can be seen when comparing Trump’s announcement speech for his candidacy to previous president George Bush. In Trump’s speech he says ““While I love my company and what I have built, I love my country even more.” [27] Meanwhile, George Bush underscores the importance of international cooperation, and the civic nationalism mentioned above stating ““The purpose of prosperity is to make sure the American dream touches every willing heart. … America’s greatest export to the world is, and always will be, freedom.”[28] As seen, while both appeal to the ideas of American exceptionalism, Bush’s speech talks about american exceptionalism extended to all while trump’s rhetoric remains nationalistic and against the international spirit.
In conclusion, nationalism has been a primary cause of both order and disorder on international politics. However, whether or not nationalism causes order or disorder depends on the historical myths and how they are deployed by leaders and societies. While nationalism can lead to conflict and instability, it can also play a role in the formation of an international society based on mutual respect and cooperation through both mutual understanding and institution based contact.
[1] Pablo De Orellana and Nicholas Michelsen, Global Nationalism: Ideas, Movements And Dynamics In The Twenty-first Century (London, United Kingdom: World Scientific Publishing Europe Ltd., 2023), 16, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kcl/reader.action?docID=7132519
[2] Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Fourth Edition (London, United Kingdom: Red Globe Press, 2012),44
[3] Bull, “The Anarchical Society”, 8
[4] Igor Makhram Ali Nabi, “International Order Maintenance Mechanisms in the Contemporary System of International Relations,” Historia I Polityka 12, No. 19 (2014): 69, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/HiP.2014.019
[5] Stephen Pelz, “Review: Present at the Misconception? The Negotiation of the New World Order, 1942-1946”, Reviews in American History 19, No.3 (1991): 419, doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2703190
[6] Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?”, The National Interest, No.16 (1989): 9.
[7] Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?”, The National Interest, No.16 (1989):14-15
[8] Tarik Kochi, “A Dangerous Text: Francis Fukuyama’s Mischaracterisation of Identity, Recognition and Right-Wing Nationalism”, Borderlands Journal, Vol 20, No,2 (2021) 157
[9] Suisheng Zhao, “Chinese Nationalism and Its International Orientations”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol 115 No.1 (2000) 6 doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2658031
[10] Zhao, “Chinese Nationalism”, 5-7
[11] Pablo De Orellana and Nicholas Michelsen, Global Nationalism: Ideas, Movements And Dynamics In The Twenty-first Century (London, United Kingdom: World Scientific Publishing Europe Ltd., 2023), 16, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kcl/reader.action?docID=7132519
[12] Robert A. Scalapino “The Cultural Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy,” in The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review, ed. Chang Chun-shu, James Crump, and Rhoads Murphey (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, U of M Center For Chinese Studies, 1968), 87.
[13] Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Fourth Edition (London, United Kingdom: Red Globe Press, 2012),8
[14] Abanti Bhattacharya, “Chinese Nationalism Under Xi Jinping Revisited” India Quarterly, Vol 75 No. 2 (2019): 248
[15] Suisheng Zhao, “Chinese Nationalism and Its International Orientations”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol 115 No.1 (2000) 17 doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2658031
[16] Thomas Herber and Anja-Désirée Senz, “China's significance in international politics. Domestic
and external development and action potentials”, Paper presented at German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), Bonn, 2007, https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/199262/1/die-dp-2007-01.pdf
[17] Matt Pottinger, Matthew Johnson, and David Feith, “Xi Jinping in His Own Words
What China’s Leader Wants—and How to Stop Him From Getting It,” Foreign Affairs, November 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/xi-jinping-his-own-words?check_logged_in=1&utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=article_link&utm_term=article_email&utm_content=20240817
[18] Zhao, “Chinese Nationalism”, 14-15
[19] Bhattacharya, “Chinese Nationalism Revisited”, 248-249
[20] Hilde Eliassen Restad, “Old Paradigms in History Die Hard in Political Science: US Foreign Policy and American Exceptionalism”, American Political Thought, Vol 1 No.1 (2012): 61
[21] Restad, “American Exceptionalism”, 61
[22] Henry R. Nau, Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan (New Jersey, United States: Princeton University Press, 2013), 50, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvc77cnp.7.
[23] Thapiporn Suporn, “Unravelling Triadic Relationship in Trump’s Foreign Policy: Internationalism, Nationalism, and Trumpism”, International Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol 23 No.2 (2019): 47
[24] Suporn, “Trump’s Foreign Policy”, 47
[25] Thapiporn Suporn, “Unravelling Triadic Relationship in Trump’s Foreign Policy: Internationalism, Nationalism, and Trumpism”, International Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol 23 No.2 (2019): 46-47
[26] Suporn, “Trump’s Foreign Policy”, 51
[27] Time Magazine, “Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech,”, last accessed 18th August 2024, https://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/.
[28] The American Presidency Project, “Remarks Announcing Candidacy for the Republican Presidential Nomination”, Last accessed 18th August 2024, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-announcing-candidacy-for-the-republican-presidential-nomination-1.
References
Bhattacharya, Abanti, “Chinese Nationalism Under Xi Jinping Revisited” India Quarterly, 75 No. 2 (June 2019): 248,249
Bull, Hedley The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Fourth Edition (London, United Kingdom: Red Globe Press, 2012)
Fukuyama, Francis “The End of History?”, The National Interest, Vol 1. No.16 (Summer 1989): 9, 14-15.
Herber, Thomas and Senz, Anja-Désirée, “China's significance in international politics. Domestic and external development and action potentials”, Paper presented at German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), Bonn, 2007, https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/199262/1/die-dp-2007-01.pdf
Kochi, Tarik “A Dangerous Text: Francis Fukuyama’s Mischaracterisation of Identity, Recognition and Right-Wing Nationalism”, Borderlands Journal, 20, No,2 (2021) 157
Nabi, Igor Makhram Ali, “International Order Maintenance Mechanisms in the Contemporary System of International Relations,” Historia I Polityka 12, No. 19 (2014): 69, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/HiP.2014.019
Nau, Henry R., Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan New Jersey, 50, United States: Princeton University Press, 2013, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvc77cnp.7.
Orellana, Pablo De and Michelsen, Nicholas, Global Nationalism: Ideas, Movements And Dynamics In The Twenty-first Century 16 London, United Kingdom: World Scientific Publishing Europe Ltd., 2023 https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kcl/reader.action?docID=7132519
Pelz, Stephen “Review: Present at the Misconception? The Negotiation of the New World Order, 1942-1946”, Reviews in American History 19, No.3 (September 1991): 419, doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2703190
Pottinger, Matt, Johnson, Matthew, and Feith, David, “Xi Jinping in His Own WordsWhat China’s Leader Wants—and How to Stop Him From Getting It,” Foreign Affairs, 16 August 2024 , https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/xi-jinping-his-own-words?check_logged_in=1&utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=article_link&utm_term=article_email&utm_content=20240817
Restad, Hilde Eliassen, “Old Paradigms in History Die Hard in Political Science: US Foreign Policy and American Exceptionalism”, American Political Thought, 1 No.1 (Spring 2012): 61
Scalapino, Robert A. “The Cultural Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy,” in The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review, ed. Chang Chun-shu, James Crump, and Rhoads Murphey Michigan: University of Michigan Press, U of M Center For Chinese Studies, 1968), 87.
Suporn, Thapiporn, “Unravelling Triadic Relationship in Trump’s Foreign Policy: Internationalism, Nationalism, and Trumpism”, International Journal of East Asian Studies, 23 No.2 (July-December 2019): 47
The American Presidency Project, “Remarks Announcing Candidacy for the Republican Presidential Nomination”, Last accessed 18th August 2024, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-announcing-candidacy-for-the-republican-presidential-nomination-1.
Time Magazine, “Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech,”, last accessed 18th August 2024, https://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/.
Zhao, Suisheng “Chinese Nationalism and Its International Orientations”, Political Science Quarterly, 115 No.1 (Spring 2000) 6 doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2658031 5,6,7,14,15,17